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 ABSTRACT 
 
Asia’s rapid population aging fortifies the case for strengthening human capital investments. Further, the 
experience of the newly industrialized economies suggests that human capital investments will be a vital 
ingredient of the transition from middle income to high income. Those investments can also affect 
equity and public finances. In this paper, we use data from the National Transfer Accounts to empirically 
analyze the effect of human capital investment in Asian countries on economic growth, inequality, and 
fiscal balance. Our empirical evidence suggests that human capital investments have a positive effect 
on labor productivity and, hence, output. The positive effect is stronger for poorer households and, 
hence, beneficial for equity. We also find that such investments can generate sufficient tax revenues to 
improve the fiscal balance. Overall, our evidence points to a positive effect of human capital on growth, 
equity, and fiscal balance in Asia. 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Asia, fiscal balance, growth, human capital, inequality 
 
JEL codes: J24, H52, I24, I25 
 
 
 I. INTRODUCTION 
 
One major consequence of Asia’s sustained rapid growth is the region’s transformation from a low-
income region to a middle-income region in a short span of time. As recently as 1992, more than 90% of 
Asia’s population lived in low-income countries, but by 2014, more than 95% of its population lived in 
middle-income countries (ADB 2017). The challenge now facing the region is to keep up the growth 
momentum, and make the next transition from middle income to high income. By and large, the 
transition from middle to high income is challenging. This explains why many middle-income countries 
in Latin America and in Asia remain in middle income for a long time, a tendency widely known as the 
middle-income trap. 
 
One group of middle-income economies that successfully graduated to high income are the 
newly industrialized economies: Hong Kong, China; the Republic of Korea; Singapore; and Taipei,China. 
Exceptionally rapid growth enabled the newly industrialized economies to transition from middle to high 
income in a relatively short period, less than 25 years in the Republic of Korea’s case. A large number of 
empirical and theoretical analyses of possible drivers of this phenomenon almost invariably finds a 
central role of human capital on economic growth (Mankiw, Romer, and Weil 1992; Barro 2001; and 
Aghion and Howitt 2009). Further, these studies indicate that government policies played an important 
role in accumulating human capital and allocating human capital to productive uses.  Recent studies find 
that knowledge capital can also help explain the rapid growth of the East Asian economies (Hanushek 
and Woessmann 2016). 
 
The rapid aging of Asia’s population further strengthens the case for human capital accumulation, 
and spotlights its potential contribution to economic growth. Intuitively, more productive workers can 
offset the adverse effect of fewer workers. The share of the elderly population is rising across the entire 
region, although the current status of population aging still varies a lot across the region. For instance, India 
and the Philippines are still relatively young, while the People’s Republic of China and Thailand have 
significantly older populations. The Republic of Korea and Singapore are at an advanced stage of 
demographic transition. Despite such heterogeneity, there is a clear regionwide trend toward older 
populations and, even in younger Asian countries, the demographic dividends associated with large 
working-age populations are set to dwindle in the foreseeable future (ADB 2011). The pace of 
demographic transition is taking place at a very rapid rate in some Asian economies, especially in East Asia. 
Between 2000 and 2050, the old-age dependency ratio will increase by a factor of six in the Republic of 
Korea, while it will quadruple in the People’s Republic of China. In the absence of significant human capital 
investments, many aging middle-income Asian economies may see their growth fall sharply.  
 
A shift in population age structure can have two effects on growth. The first demographic 
dividend is a very direct effect on income and consumption due to a decline in fertility. Over the second 
half of the 20th century and early 21st century, a secular fertility decline has caused radical and 
important changes in the population age distribution in Asia and the rest of the world. In the medium 
term, countries in the early stage of demographic transition have gained from a rising share of the 
working-age population relative to the young and elderly (Bloom and Williamson 1998, Kelley and 
Schmidt 2001, Mason 2001, and Mason and Lee 2007). The same demographic forces have improved 
fiscal health in developing Asia in the short run (Lee, Kim, and Park 2016).1 The second demographic 
dividend stems from a scaling up of human capital investment and is associated with three main effects: 
                                                            
1 In the longer term, however, populations being increasingly concentrated at older ages will put significant strain on the fiscal 
system in Asia, not only in countries with especially generous public support systems for the elderly, but also in countries 
that rely heavily on labor income taxes to finance public consumption. 
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higher consumption growth, greater physical capital per worker, and better and more human capital. 
Mason, Lee, and Jiang (2016) estimate these effects and find that human capital is a highly significant 
channel of this demographic dividend.  Both Mason, Lee, and Jiang (2016) and Lee and Mason (2010) 
find that fertility decline that is accompanied by an increase in human capital investment in children can 
substantially boost economic growth. 
 
In addition to its effect on economic growth, human capital investment can influence income 
inequality and fiscal balance. While sustained rapid growth has enabled developing Asia to reduce 
poverty on an unprecedented scale, the region faces the challenge of rising inequality (ADB 2012). 
Indeed, the widening income gap between the rich and the poor is a global problem. Lack of education 
is a major cause of poverty and a deterrent to upward socioeconomic mobility. By strengthening the 
skills and knowledge of the poor, education can enhance their human capital and earning power, and 
thus lower inequality. The public sector still provides much of education in most countries. Public 
education contributes to a country’s stock of human capital and enhances the productivity of its 
workers. Higher labor productivity increases output, and hence taxable income and government 
revenues.  On the other hand, education provision is costly, which explains why education tends to take 
up a substantial share of the government budget. Therefore, an increase in public sector investment in 
human capital can either improve or worsen the fiscal balance. 
 
The central objective of this paper is to empirically examine the effect of human capital 
investment on labor productivity, inequality, and fiscal balance in middle-income Asia. To do so, we use 
data from the National Transfer Accounts (NTA). 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the empirical framework, i.e., 
data and model, used for our analysis. Section III reports and discusses a simple case study that simulates 
the impact of human capital spending on different population groups of the Philippines. The case study 
allows us to analyze the distributional effects of targeted human capital spending. Section IV reports the 
simulation results of applying our model to 12 Asian countries. The results suggest that human capital 
investment not only increases labor productivity and hence output, but also reduces income inequality 
and improves the government’s fiscal balance. Section V concludes the paper. 
 
 
II. EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
In this section, we describe the data and model we use for our empirical analysis. 
 
A. Data 
 
Our major source of data is the NTA (www.ntaccounts.org), an accounting framework which 
documents economic flows across populations of different ages in a manner consistent with the United 
Nations System of National Accounts (UN DESA 2013). NTA has been estimated for more than 60 
countries by an international network of academics, researchers, and government statisticians 
collaborating under the NTA project. The economic lifecycles are estimated from household surveys 
and government administrative data, and are scaled to match aggregate controls compiled based on the 
United Nations System of National Accounts. NTA provides a detailed measure on how much people 
consume and produce at different ages, and how the gap in their consumption and production is funded 
through other sources, namely transfers and asset-based reallocations. Except for labor income, NTA 
distinguish between flows mediated by the private and public sectors. Some early cross-country studies 
based on NTA include Lee, Lee, and Mason (2008); Mason et al. (2009); and Lee and Mason (2011). 
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NTA estimates in current local currency units were converted to constant 2011 United Sates dollars 
using purchasing power parity factors (World Bank 2016). 
 
Data on human capital spending and labor income are based on NTA lifecycle estimates in 12 
Asian economies; namely, Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, 
Mongolia, Nepal, the Philippines, Thailand, Timor-Leste, and Viet Nam. These economies range from 
low income to high income, but are predominantly middle income.  We measure human capital 
investments based on NTA estimates of public and private expenditures on education and health at 
each age. The NTA measure of human capital expenditure might contain some useful information about 
quality of human capital, an important dimension of human capital. It also allows us to consider both 
public and private human capital investment separately.  
 
Following Lee and Mason (2010), we include education expenditure for ages 0–26. We only 
consider health care expenditure for ages 0–17 to exclude health spending related to reproductive 
health. It is important to note that NTA estimate of human capital spending only captures goods and 
services available from the market, and does not include the opportunity cost of time of students or the 
value of services provided by parents and other family members who contribute to human capital. 
 
Analyzing fiscal effects necessarily requires estimates of tax profiles. NTA distinguishes public 
transfer flows to and from households by purpose, e.g., education, health, and pension, and by source, 
e.g., labor income tax, consumption tax, and social security contributions. These estimates are not 
available for some Asian countries in our sample. As an alternative, we use country-specific personal 
income tax rates and NTA labor income age profile estimates to construct country tax profiles. 
 
B. Model 
 
The analysis builds on recent research by Mason, Lee, and Jiang (2016) simulating the impact of the 
demographic transition on the aggregate economy through greater investments on children, specifically 
on their human capital. We focus on the impact of expanding human capital investments on both 
productivity and inequality in developing Asia countries. We also look into how various targeted 
government interventions to raise human capital may affect fiscal sustainability. 
 
Following Mason, Lee, and Jiang (2016), we specify that the aggregate economy is governed by 
a production function similar to that proposed by Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) 
 
௧ܻ ൌ ܭ௧ఈܪ௧ఉܮ௧ͩିఈିఉ  (1)
 
where ௧ܻ  is aggregate output at period ݐ, ܭ is capital, ܪ is human capital, and ܮ is raw labor. As shown in 
Mason, Lee, and Jiang (2016), the share of production that accrues to labor ௧ܻ௟ , as payment for human 
capital and for basic labor, is given by 
 
௧ܻ௟ ൌ ߚ ௧ܻ ൅ ሺͩ െ ߙ െ ߚሻ ௧ܻ (2)
 
with aggregate contribution of age ݔ as follows: 
 
௧ܻ௟ሺݔሻ ൌ ߚ ௧ܻ ܪ௧
ሺݔሻ
ܪ௧ ൅ ሺͩ െ ߙ െ ߚሻ ௧ܻ
ܮ௧ሺݔሻ
ܮ௧  
(3)
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The aggregate stocks of human capital and raw labor are respectively calculated as the sums of 
their age-specific aggregate stocks, and are given by 
 
ܪ௧ ൌ෍ܪ௧ሺݔሻ
௫
ൌ ෍݄௧ሺݔሻ݈௧ሺݔሻ ௧ܰሺݔሻ
௫
 (4)
ܮ௧ ൌ ෍ܮ௧ሺݔሻ
௫
ൌ ෍݈௧ሺݔሻ ௧ܰሺݔሻ
௫
 (5)
 
where ௧ܰሺݔሻ is population, ݄௧ሺݔሻ is average human capital stock, and ݈௧ሺݔሻ is effective labor at age ݔ. 
Note that in the above formulation of human capital stock, increasing average human capital by itself 
does not necessarily increase the stock of human capital available in the economy. Instead, it must be 
combined with the effective labor supply. The returns to investing on the human capital of children 
therefore are not realized until later when children mature, join the labor force, and begin working. 
 
We further assume that the production of human capital is governed by the following 
production function: 
 
݄௧ሺݔሻ ൌ ߟ௜ൣ߶௚݈௚ሺݔሻ ൅ ߶௙݈௙ሺݔሻ݁௭൧ఊ ൅ ሺͩ െ ߜሻ݄௧ିͩሺݔ െ ͩሻ (6)
 
where ݈௚ሺݔሻ  and ݈௙ሺݔሻ are human capital investments by government and households, respectively, and 
ߛ ∈ ሺͨ,ͩሻ is the output elasticity. The human capital stock law of motion in this equation indicates that a 
unit investment in human capital does not necessarily translate to a unit of human capital. The factor-
augmenting technologies ߶௚ ൒ ͨ and ߶௙ ൒ ͨ characterize the efficiency of the public and private 
sectors, respectively, in transforming inputs of human capital investments into units of human capital. 
Further, similar to physical capital, we allow human capital stock to depreciate at the rate ߜ per year. This 
is an important feature, especially in more advanced ages, and thus adds more realism. 
 
We also introduce heterogeneity among countries, and among individuals within countries, 
which allows us to analyze the distributional impacts of targeted human capital spending interventions. 
The parameter	ߟ௜ ൒ ͨ captures the differences in human capital production technology across 
countries, while individual heterogeneity within countries is captured by the random variable ݖ, which 
we assume to be drawn from some zero-mean normal distribution with variance ߪ௜ .   
 
Note that, with the assumption of a Cobb–Douglas production function, the shares of total labor 
income accruing to human capital and to raw labor are 
 
ܪ௧
௧ܻ௟
ൌ ߚͩ െ ߙ  
(7)
ܮ௧
௧ܻ௟
ൌ ͩ െ ߙ െ ߚͩ െ ߙ  
(8)
 
Expression (3) may be combined with (7) and (8) to calculate the share of labor income at each 
age group. This is the same expression used in Mason, Lee, and Jiang (2016) to estimate age-specific 
labor supply. 
 
௧ܻ௟ሺݔሻ
௧ܻ௟
ൌ ߚͩ െ ߙ
ܪ௧ሺݔሻ
ܪ௧ ൅
ͩ െ ߙ െ ߚ
ͩ െ ߙ
ܮ௧ሺݔሻ
ܮ௧  
(9)
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The expression in (3) may also be restated in per capita terms by dividing both sides of the 
equation by the age-specific population.  
 
௧ܻ௟ሺݔሻ
௧ܰሺݔሻ ൌ
ܪ௧ሺݔሻ
௧ܰሺݔሻ ൅
ܮ௧ሺݔሻ
௧ܰሺݔሻ  
(10)
 
We estimate the parameters of ݄௧ሺݔሻ, and ݈௧ሺݔሻ based on restrictions imposed by equations (7), 
(8), (9), and (10), using simulated method of moments. To simplify our estimation, we limit the 
parameter space we are estimating by setting the production elasticities ߙ and ߚ to be both equal to 
one-third, based on earlier estimates by Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992), and following Mason, Lee, 
and Jiang (2016). For our baseline estimates, we follow the assumption of Mason, Lee, and Jiang (2016) 
that public and private human capital spending are equally effective by setting ߶௚ ൌ ߶௙ ൌ ͩ, and we 
show how the results vary when we increase the efficiency of publicly provided human capital 
investment. Finally, we assume ߜ to be 0.02.  
 
Estimation of the rest of the parameters are done in two stages. First, we estimate ߛ and ߟ using 
NTA estimates of labor income, and public and private human capital spending per capita age profiles 
for 58 economies estimated for a recent year. For each economy in our sample, we simulate 10,000 
individuals by drawing a series of random shocks for equation (6) from a standard normal distribution, 
which are held constant throughout the estimation. The random shocks are then used to calculate the 
moments implied in equations (7), (8), (9), and (10). These simulated moments are stacked to form the 
vector ܲெሺߛ, ߟሻ. Next, we calculate the analogues of ܲெሺߛ, ߟሻ from the data in the vector ܲ஽ . Following 
Meghir and Pistaferri (2004), we estimate ሺߛ, ߟሻ by minimizing the objective function: 
 
ܳሺߛ, ߟሻ ൌ ሾܲெሺߛ, ߟሻ െ ܲ஽ሿ′ሾܲெሺߛ, ߟሻ െ ܲ஽ሿ (11)
 
Note that ߛ and ߟ may be seen as average estimates for all economies in our sample. Also, the 
distribution of private human capital investment shocks is the same for all countries. To provide country-
specific estimates of ߟ and ߪ, we repeat the above procedure for each economy separately, but this time 
holding ߛ, in addition to ߜ, ߙ, ߚ,	߶௚, and ߶௙, fixed. We modify the moment conditions in (11) by including 
an additional restriction to allow us to estimate ߪ for each economy. More specifically, we match the 
simulated labor income Gini coefficient from the model with the observed income Gini coefficient in 
each of the economies in our sample. The estimated parameters are then used to simulate the impact 
of raising human capital spending on labor productivity, income inequality, and fiscal balance.  
 
In addition to the above model, we also employ a heuristic model using the Philippines as a case 
study. The model is based on subnational NTA estimates. Let ݈ ௚ሺݔ, ݆ሻ, ݈ ௙ሺݔ, ݆ሻ, and ݕ௟ሺݔ, ݆ሻ be the average 
public and private human capital investments, and labor income, respectively, at each age ݔ for an 
individual from some class ݆.  In this naïve simulation, we assume that the labor income age profile is 
directly linked to the schedule of human capital investments, such that increasing human capital 
spending in some class ݇	to match the higher spending in some class ݈ leads to class ݇ individuals earning 
labor income at the same schedule as class ݈ workers. We apply this model using recent subnational 
Philippines NTA estimates calculated for terciles of household income by residence location (Abrigo et 
al. 2016). This application takes advantage of the increasing availability of subnational NTA estimates, 
and is in line with recent work which simulates the economic impact of counterfactual economic 
lifecycle schedules on specific subpopulations (Mejia-Guevara 2014; and Miller, Saad, and Martinez 
2016). 
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III. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM THE PHILIPPINES CASE STUDY 
 
In this section, we report and discuss the empirical results from a case study based on subnational data 
from the Philippines. Average labor incomes by age, socioeconomic class, and residence are presented 
in Figure 1. The labor income age profiles include earnings and benefits of employees, both those working 
locally and abroad, and self-employment labor income, as well as imputed wages of unpaid family 
workers. This measure captures age variations in labor force participation, hours worked, productivity, 
and other factors that influence labor supply decisions. Typical of labor income age profiles, it starts from 
zero when young, increases in adulthood, peaks at prime age, and then declines as people retire from the 
labor market. 
 
Figure 1: Labor Income by Age, Income Group, and Residence: Philippines, 2011
 
 
 
Source: Abrigo et al. (2016). 
 
The figure highlights not just stark differences in overall levels of income, but also important 
differences in labor income sources, and timing of labor force entry and exit. For instance, at peak 
productive ages, the average labor incomes of workers from rich households are about quadruple those 
from low-income households in both rural and urban areas. As workers move up the socioeconomic 
ladder, we see labor income to be increasingly compressed toward a narrower age band, reflecting the 
increasing importance of paid employment in the formal economy in labor income. This trend may also 
reflect the degree of availability of different support systems accessible to populations at either end of 
the economic lifecycle. For example, schooling keeps the young from working, but poverty may induce 
children to leave school and work for pay. Insufficient pension income may induce the elderly to 
continue working to support their consumption. 
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Among poorer households, self-employment labor income is an important source of support, 
accounting for as much as 36% of total labor income among low-income rural households, and as much 
as 18% for low-income urban households. The share of self-employment in total labor income declines 
progressively with socioeconomic status as more workers enter formal labor markets, including those 
overseas. Among rich households, earnings from overseas employment account for about a third of total 
labor income in both rural and urban households. This share declines as one moves down the 
socioeconomic ladder, although it remains substantial. Among low-income rural households, earnings 
from temporary international migration accounts for about 29% of all labor income, while the figure is 
23% for low-income urban households. It is noteworthy that the age profile of overseas labor income 
peaks at younger ages relative to the age profile of local labor income, indicating the age-based 
selectivity of international labor migration. 
 
These differences in labor income profiles across subgroups are likely to persist into the future 
when we consider current human capital spending patterns. Figure 2 presents the age profile of average 
human capital spending by socioeconomic status and residence. Public and private spending on health 
and education are separated to compare and contrast differences across subpopulations. Similar to the 
labor income age profiles, there is large disparity in human capital spending across groups, with per capita 
spending by age increasing with socioeconomic status, and between rural and urban households.  
 
Figure 2: Human Capital Spending by Age, Income Group, and Residence: Philippines, 2011
 
 
 
Source: Abrigo et al. (2016). 
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Human capital spending forms a substantial share of total consumption. Among low-income 
rural households, for instance, 10% of total consumption is human capital spending. The share ranges 
between 6% and 8% in other socioeconomic groups. Among poorer households, public provision of 
health and education is an important aspect of investment in children, accounting for about 71% of total 
human capital spending among low-income urban households, and about 82% among low-income rural 
households. Among richer households, public provision plays only a secondary role, with about 92% of 
human capital spending on children in rich urban households and about 73% in rich rural households 
done privately. 
 
In terms of type of spending, education accounts for over half of human capital investments, 
although a significant uptick in health spending on infants and children is evident from the human capital 
spending age profiles of rich households. Public spending is largely skewed toward basic education, 
which partly reflects high public school participation rates, and partly reflects the government budget 
allocated to each education level. Private education spending, on the other hand, is more concentrated 
in postsecondary education. 
 
The observed differences in human capital investments across subgroups, to some degree, may 
reflect their demographic conditions. Lee and Mason (2010), for instance, using cross-sectional NTA 
data of human capital spending and fertility, estimate that a 1% drop in fertility is related to about a 1% 
increase in lifetime human capital spending. This negative relationship between number of children and 
human capital spending can also be observed in the Philippines, not only in the cross-section data but 
also in time series data.  
 
Figure 3 shows a plot of human capital spending per capita summed over the relevant ages by 
socioeconomic status and residence. The synthetic cohort estimates of human capital spending spans 
2 decades. The right-most estimates for each group are for 1991 and the left-most estimates are for 2011. 
We use the ratio of young dependents ages 0–24 to adults ages 25 or higher as proxy for fertility. The 
number of young dependents per adult has declined over the years covered. At the same time, human 
capital spending has increased, although the increase has been more rapid among richer households, 
who coincidentally have lower young dependency ratio. While the plot does not indicate the direction 
of causation between the number of children and human capital investments, it does reflect a strong 
relationship between the quantity and the quality of children. 
 
How can targeted human capital spending interventions alleviate the current disparity in human 
capital across the population? We experiment with alternative scenarios where average human capital 
spending and labor income age schedules of lower-income households are replaced by spending and 
income patterns of higher-income households. This allows us to evaluate the possible impact of targeted 
interventions to raise human capital spending in lower-income households. The profiles are all based on 
2011 Philippines subnational NTA estimates. We assume that the increase in human capital spending is 
borne entirely by the government.  
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Figure 3: Human Capital Spending and Number of 
Children: Philippines, 1991, 1999, and 2011 
 
 
 
Note: The right-most estimate for each group refers to the 1991 estimate, the 
middle to the 1999 estimate, and the left-most to the 2011 estimate. 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from Abrigo et al. (2016). 
 
We consider three scenarios. In the first scenario, average human capital spending and labor 
income age schedules of rural households are replaced by those of urban households. In the second 
scenario, the age profiles of lower-income populations are replaced by the age profiles of the next 
higher-income class in our analysis, i.e., low-income profiles are replaced by middle-income profiles, and 
middle-income profiles are replaced by high-income profiles. In the last scenario, age profiles of low-
income urban households and of low-income and middle-income rural households are replaced by the 
age profiles of middle-income urban households. We then compare how the resulting distribution of 
human capital spending would change relative to a baseline scenario of no change in human capital 
spending. 
 
Figure 4 presents concentration curves of human capital spending under our four different 
policy scenarios. The concentration curve plots the cumulative distribution of human capital spending, 
representing benefits, on the vertical axis, and the cumulative distribution of population age 26 and 
below sorted by socioeconomic status, representing benefit recipients, on the horizontal axis. A 
concentration curve above the 45-degree diagonal line indicates that the distribution of human capital 
spending is progressive, where spending on poorer households is larger than their share of the recipient 
population. A curve below the 45-degree line indicates that richer households receive a higher share of 
the total human capital spending.  
 
Panel A presents the observed benefit incidence of human capital spending in 2011. The plot 
indicates that total human capital spending is regressive. When disaggregated by source, we see that the 
disparity is largely due to private spending, which is highly skewed toward richer households. Total 
human capital spending by government appears to be neutral. However, there are some nuances when 
the distribution of public human capital spending is further disaggregated. When broken down by age, 
0
200
400
600
800
0.75 1.00 1.25 1.50 1.75 2.00 2.25 2.50
H
um
an
 c
ap
ita
l s
pe
nd
in
g 
pe
r c
ap
ita
 
(t
ho
us
an
d 
pe
so
)
(s
yn
th
et
ic
 c
oh
or
t a
ge
 0
–2
6)
Population age 0–24/Population age 25+
Rural: Low income Rural: Middle income
Rural: High income Urban:  Low income
Urban:  Middle income Urban:  High income
10   |   ADB Economics Working Paper Series No. 529 
public human capital spending is more progressive for younger children, i.e., those in basic education, 
and slightly regressive for older children, i.e., those in higher education. This feature has been 
documented earlier in the Philippines (Manasan, Cuenca, and Villanueva-Ruiz 2007), as well as in other 
countries (Davoodi, Tiongson, and Asawanuchit 2010). 
 
Figure 4: Human Capital Inequality: Observed and Simulated 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from Abrigo et al. (2016). 
 
In panels B, C, and D, we show the corresponding change in concentration curves under our 
specified alternative scenarios. The concentration curves for private spending do not change across 
scenarios since we assume that the additional spending is borne by the government. Overall, the plots 
indicate that targeted spending alleviates inequalities in human capital investments as a result of 
propoor public human capital spending. However, there are some qualitative differences. Results from 
our simulation show that the urban-to-rural (panel B) and the low-to-middle/middle-to-high (panel C) 
targeted human capital spending scenarios are likely to benefit middle-income households more than 
low-income households. Setting a minimum level of human capital spending age schedule (panel D), 
which here we peg at the spending level of middle-income urban households, will benefit the poorest 
the most. 
 
The concentration curves in Figure 4 are summarized in Table 1 by calculating the implied Suits 
index. The index ranges from –1 to 1, where a value of –1 indicates that all human capital spending goes 
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to the poorest person in the economy, while a value of 1 signifies that all spending goes to the richest 
person. At baseline, combined public and private human capital spending’s Suits index is at 0.19. This is 
comparable with the 0.24 estimated by Mesa (2007) using years of schooling in 2000. 
 
The estimated Suits index confirms our earlier observation, based on concentration curves, that 
targeted spending interventions reduce human capital inequality. Depending on the scenario, the Suits 
index for total human capital spending drops by 2–5 percentage points. This is due to public human 
capital spending becoming more progressive, with the Suits index ranging from –0.01 to –0.05 from a 
baseline value of 0.01. Because of the higher spending among lower-income households, average 
lifetime human capital spending per person is projected to increase between 9% and 58% of the baseline 
level, with the government funding 45%–62% of the total spending from the baseline 40%. 
 
Table 1: Human Capital Spending and Inequality: Observed and Simulated 
 
Simulation Scenario 
Human Capital Spending Suits Coefficient
Combined
(% of baseline) 
Public
(% of total) 
Combined 
Spending 
Public 
Spending 
Baseline (status quo) 100.0 40.0 0.19 0.01
Rural–urban scenario 108.9 44.9 0.17 –0.01
Low–middle/Middle–high scenario 158.4 62.1 0.15 –0.05
Urban–middle scenario 128.3 53.3 0.14 –0.05
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
 
The increased human capital spending is projected to boost labor income by about 30%–50% 
of the baseline value. This effectively increases the tax base. Table 2 summarizes the projected impact 
of our targeted interventions on the government’s fiscal position. On a per person basis, lifetime personal 
income tax is projected to increase between 42% and 155% of the baseline value. Effective tax rates will 
also increase by 2–6 percentage points of the baseline 9% as more income may be taxed at higher tax 
schedules.  
 
Taking the costs of additional public spending into consideration, each additional government 
peso invested in human capital is projected to bring in additional P1.08–P1.11 for the government in 
personal income taxes. Even with higher tax rates levied on income, households are still projected to 
benefit from the increased public human capital spending, with post-tax rate of return ranging between 
13% and 16%. The government, in turn, may further benefit from the increased spending of households 
through taxes levied on consumption of goods and services. 
 
Table 2: Human Capital Spending and Fiscal Returns 
 
Simulation Scenario 
Average Lifetime Personal (Labor) 
Income Tax Per Person Internal Rate of Return (%) 
Level
(% of baseline) 
Effective Tax 
Rate (%) Fiscal 
Individual 
(post-tax) 
Baseline (status quo) 100.0 8.9 … …
Rural–urban scenario 142.2 11.2 10.8 16.1
Low–middle/Middle–high scenario 255.0 15.0 7.6 13.1
Urban–middle scenario 183.9 12.8 8.6 15.0
… = Not available 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
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IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM SIMULATION RESULTS FOR ASIA 
 
In this section, we report and discuss the results of simulating the effect of increasing human capital 
spending on labor income, income inequality, and fiscal balance for 12 Asian countries. Figure 5 plots 
lifetime public and private human capital investments in Asia and in other countries where NTA 
estimates are available. For cross-country comparability, we normalized the values relative to the 
average labor income of persons ages 30–49. This allows us to control cross-country differences, 
including labor costs, which are important in the production of education services (Mason, Lee, and 
Jiang 2016). Estimates below (above) the 45-degree line indicate greater share of the private (public) 
sector in financing human capital spending.  Estimates that are closer to (more distant from) the origin 
signify smaller (greater) human capital spending in total. 
 
Figure 5: Public versus Private Human Capital Spending 
in Developing Asia 
 
 
 
BAN = Bangladesh, CAM = Cambodia, IND = India, INO = Indonesia,  
KOR = Republic of Korea, MAL = Malaysia, MON = Mongolia, NEP = Nepal,  
PHI = Philippines, THA = Thailand, TIM = Timor-Leste, VIE = Viet Nam. 
Notes: Lifetime public and private human capital spending is based on a synthetic 
cohort measure of health and education spending based on National Transfer 
Accounts data for a recent year. It is calculated as the sum of public and private per 
capita health consumption for ages 0–17, and of public and private per capita 
education consumption for ages 3–27. 
Sources: Authors’ calculation based on National Transfer Account data. 
www.ntaccounts.org (accessed 5 November 2016).
 
Human capital spending in Asia varies greatly from country to country, both in level and in 
financing source. Thailand, for instance, invests on average about 5 years of prime-age labor income on 
human capital for each person. In Bangladesh, on the other hand, the average lifetime human capital 
spending per person is only 1.4 years of prime-age labor income. Viet Nam and Timor-Leste spend about 
2.3 years of labor income on human capital per person, but Viet Nam relies largely on private spending 
rather than on government. The variations in human capital spending are, to some extent, related to 
each country’s level of economic development. 
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Figure 6 plots each country’s average lifetime human capital spending against its per capita gross 
national income. Two observations are self-evident. First, higher-income countries invest more on 
human capital per person (panel A). That investing in human capital is important in promoting economic 
growth has been well emphasized in the literature. While the majority of Asian countries in our sample 
are investing around the average level of their income group, if not more, there are some countries like 
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Timor-Leste that invest substantially below the average.  
 
Figure 6: Human Capital Spending and Gross National Income per Capita 
 
 (a) Total human capital spending (b) Public share of human capital spending 
 
 
BAN = Bangladesh, CAM = Cambodia, GNI = gross national income, IND = India, INO = Indonesia, KOR = Republic of Korea,  
MAL = Malaysia, MON = Mongolia, NEP = Nepal, PHI = Philippines, PPP = purchasing power parity, THA = Thailand, TIM = Timor-Leste, 
VIE = Viet Nam.  
Notes: Lifetime public and private human capital spending is based on a synthetic cohort measure of health and education spending 
based on National Transfer Accounts data. It is calculated as the sum of public and private per capita health consumption for ages 0–17, 
and of public and private per capita education consumption for ages 3–27.  
Sources: Authors’ calculation based on National Transfer Account data. www.ntaccounts.org; per capita GNI data are from the World 
Bank World Development Indicators. http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators (both accessed 5 November 
2016). 
 
Second, the contribution of the public sector in human capital spending intensifies as countries 
develop (panel B). While there is wide variation in the government’s share in human capital spending 
among developing countries, there is a clear upward trend as per capita gross national income increases. 
This shift toward an increasing role by governments in financing human capital investments has also 
been observed recently in health spending (Fan and Savedoff 2014), and much earlier in financing 
consumption in general (Peacock and Wiseman 1961).  
 
What could be the potential impacts of increasing human capital spending? Figure 7 presents 
the simulated effects of a universal 20% increase in human capital spending per capita on labor 
productivity growth (panel A) and on income inequality (panel B) in 12 Asian countries. These countries 
are selected based on the availability of data needed to estimate the structural model presented in the 
previous section. The simulated increase in human capital spending per person roughly equals the 
magnitude of the projected drop in average births per woman in developing Asia countries in the next 3 
decades. 
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Figure 7: Simulated Impact of Increased Human Capital Spending 
 
 (a) Labor productivity growth (%) (b) Income inequality 
 
 
BAN = Bangladesh, CAM = Cambodia, GNI = gross national income, IND = India, INO = Indonesia, KOR = Republic of Korea,  
MAL = Malaysia, MON = Mongolia, NEP = Nepal, PHI = Philippines, PPP = purchasing power parity, THA = Thailand, TIM = Timor-Leste, 
VIE = Viet Nam.  
Note: Simulated impact estimates are responses to a 20% increase in per capita human capital spending by age.  
Sources: Authors’ calculation based on National Transfer Account data. www.ntaccounts.org; per capita GNI data are from the World 
Bank World Development Indicators. http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators (both accessed 5 November 
2016). 
 
The projected impact by country shows some interesting patterns. Lower-income countries are 
likely to benefit more from increased human capital spending. Labor productivity in lower-income 
countries like Bangladesh, Cambodia, and Nepal is projected to increase by 2%–3.5% as a result of a 20% 
expansion of human capital spending per person. In more developed countries, like Malaysia and 
Thailand, the projected impact is more modest. It is quite interesting that, among countries with similar 
economic levels, for instance, Bangladesh and India, the projected impact of human capital spending on 
labor productivity can differ quite substantially, reflecting their different population age profiles of 
productivity. The simulated impact on productivity growth in the Republic of Korea and Nepal is about 
the same despite the huge disparity in income level, suggesting that human capital spending may still 
benefit higher-income countries despite the general reduction in impact as per capita income rises. 
 
In addition, human capital spending has a significant impact on reducing inequality. Again, the 
impact is greatest among lower-income countries than in more-developed economies. In Bangladesh, 
Cambodia, Nepal, and Viet Nam, for instance, increased human capital spending is projected to bring 
down income Gini coefficients by 3%–5% relative to baseline values. In more developed Thailand and 
Malaysia, the impact is more modest, ranging from 1% to 2% drop. 
 
The welfare impact of human capital spending may be traced to its greater impact on poorer 
households, especially in lower-income countries (Table 3). In Bangladesh and Cambodia, for instance, 
labor productivity among the poorest income quintile households is projected to increase by about 7%–
8%. The impact on higher-income households is also substantial, but smaller. 
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Table 3: Simulated Impact of Human Capital Spending on Productivity Growth and Inequality 
 
Country 
% Change in Inequality  
Productivity Growth Rate (%) 
by Income Quintile 
Human 
Capital 
Labor 
Income  
Q1 
(poorest) Q2 Q3 Q4 
Q5 
(richest) 
All 
Groups 
Bangladesh –6.7 –4.1 7.5 5.7 4.0 2.4 0.6 2.7
Cambodia –7.2 –4.5 7.4 6.1 4.6 2.8 0.8 3.1
India –3.7 –2.1 3.4 3.3 2.8 2.0 0.3 1.6
Indonesia –2.3 –1.3 2.3 2.2 1.9 1.3 0.2 1.0
Republic of Korea –5.1 –3.1 4.9 4.3 3.5 2.3 0.5 2.1
Malaysia –0.3 –0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.1
Mongolia –5.8 –3.5 5.7 4.9 3.9 2.5 0.6 2.4
Nepal –5.1 –3.1 4.7 4.3 3.5 2.4 0.5 2.2
Philippines –4.3 –2.6 4.7 4.2 3.3 2.1 0.4 1.9
Thailand –2.9 –1.7 2.6 2.6 2.5 1.9 0.3 1.3
Timor-Leste –4.5 –2.4 3.5 3.5 3.3 2.8 0.6 2.0
Viet Nam –4.1 –2.5 4.7 3.9 2.9 1.7 0.3 1.7
Q = Income quintile. 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
 
The increase in worker productivity is expected to benefit the government as well. The fiscal 
effect of greater human capital spending depends on each country’s tax structure inasmuch as it 
depends on the government’s role in the increase in human capital spending and the effect of such 
spending on labor productivity. Personal income tax per capita in Cambodia and Timor-Leste, for 
instance, is projected to increase by at least 3% (Table 4, panel A). In other countries, the projected 
impact on government revenues are economically insignificant despite large gains in labor productivity.  
 
There are many different ways governments can intervene to increase human capital spending 
besides a universal increase in spending. For instance, governments may target human capital spending 
expansion only on vulnerable groups, while keeping current levels of spending on other groups. An alternative 
strategy could be to increase the efficiency of public spending without increasing the level of spending. These 
strategies are not mutually exclusive, and may be combined to create more targeted strategies. 
 
For further analysis, we consider three types of targeted strategies. In the first strategy, we 
assume governments increase its spending per person by 20% of the average total human capital 
spending by age. We assume that there is no change in the government’s efficiency in this scenario 
(strategy 1). In the second strategy, we assume a 20% increase in public efficiency in translating inputs 
to human capital, but we hold public spending at its baseline values (strategy 2). Finally, in the last 
scenario, we combine the two strategies, so there is a 20% increase in both human capital spending and 
human capital production efficiency (strategy 3). We then combine these three scenarios with three 
different government targeting schemes; namely, a universal program where every household benefits 
from public human capital interventions, and targeted programs that are available only to either the 
poorest 40% or poorest 60% of households. Table 4 summarizes the projected effects of different public 
human capital interventions on Asia. 
 
In all of the strategies considered, government revenues are projected to increase, with labor 
income per capita growing by as much as 3%–5% in some scenarios in some countries. Increasing both 
public efficiency and public provision of human capital spending seems to result in greater increase in 
tax collection per capita, relative to the combined impact of separately pursuing each intervention. 
There is a modest negative change, if at all, in effective tax rates, indicating that household labor income 
will grow faster than the amount collected from them in taxes by the government.  
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Table 4: Simulated Fiscal Impacts of Universal and Targeted Human Capital Interventions 
 
Country 
Change in Effective Tax Tate 
(percentage point difference)   
Growth in Personal (Labor) Income 
Tax Per Capita (%)   
Change in Gross Fiscal Rate of Return 
(percentage point difference) 
Universal Lower 40 Lower 60   Universal Lower 40 Lower 60   Universal Lower 40 Lower 60 
A. Strategy 1: Increase public spending by 20% of total human capital spending per capita by age; no change in efficiency  
Bangladesh –0.04 –0.02 –0.03 0.27 0.00 0.00 –3.26 –1.66 –2.28
Cambodia 0.01 0.01 0.01 3.53 1.86 2.56 –5.59 –2.83 –3.95
India –0.05 –0.02 –0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 –0.93 –0.41 –0.59
Indonesia –0.05 –0.03 –0.04 0.45 0.21 0.31 –1.03 –0.45 –0.66
Republic of Korea 0.00 –0.01 –0.01 2.17 1.00 1.45 –1.09 –0.48 –0.71
Malaysia –0.01 0.00 –0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 –0.83 –0.36 –0.53
Mongolia 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.45 1.26 1.77 –1.82 –0.83 –1.21
Nepal –0.05 –0.03 –0.04 0.73 0.30 0.44 –1.49 –0.67 –0.97
Philippines 0.00 –0.01 –0.01 0.47 0.23 0.35 –2.41 –1.10 –1.58
Thailand –0.10 –0.05 –0.08 0.15 0.00 0.00 –0.69 –0.30 –0.44
Timor-Leste 0.06 0.02 0.04 3.14 1.38 2.05 –0.62 –0.26 –0.41
Viet Nam –0.08 –0.05 –0.07 1.21 0.57 0.78 –5.60 –2.98 –4.03
B. Strategy 2: Increase efficiency of public human capital inputs by 20%; no change in public spending 
Bangladesh 0.00 0.00 0.00   0.03 0.00 0.00   0.00 0.00 0.00 
Cambodia 0.00 0.00 0.00   0.81 0.43 0.60   0.09 0.05 0.05 
India –0.03 –0.01 –0.02   0.01 0.00 0.00   0.00 0.00 0.00 
Indonesia –0.03 –0.02 –0.02   0.25 0.12 0.17   0.01 0.00 0.00 
Republic of Korea 1.64 0.00 0.00   0.96 0.42 0.62   0.03 0.01 0.01 
Malaysia –0.01 0.00 0.00   0.01 0.01 0.01   0.00 0.00 0.00 
Mongolia 0.00 0.00 0.00   0.83 0.42 0.59   0.04 0.02 0.02 
Nepal –0.02 –0.01 –0.02   0.36 0.15 0.21   0.02 0.01 0.01 
Philippines 0.00 –0.01 0.00   0.18 0.08 0.13   0.01 0.01 0.01 
Thailand –0.08 –0.04 –0.07   0.13 0.00 0.00   0.00 0.00 0.00 
Timor-Leste 0.05 0.02 0.03   2.80 1.23 1.82   0.10 0.04 0.04 
Viet Nam –0.02 –0.01 –0.01   0.24 0.11 0.15   0.02 0.01 0.01 
continued on next page 
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Table 4 continued 
 
Change in Effective Tax Rate 
(percentage point difference)   
Growth in Personal (Labor) Income 
Tax Per Capita (%)   
Change in Gross Fiscal Rate of Return 
(percentage point difference) 
Universal Lower 40 Lower 60   Universal Lower 40 Lower 60   Universal Lower 40 Lower 60 
C. Strategy 3: Increase in both public spending and efficiency of public human capital inputs 
Bangladesh –0.05 –0.03 –0.04   0.36 0.00 0.00   –3.26 –1.66 –2.28 
Cambodia 0.02 0.02 0.02   4.96 2.60 3.57   –5.47 –2.76 –3.88 
India –0.08 –0.04 –0.06   0.02 0.00 0.00   –0.93 –0.41 –0.59 
Indonesia –0.09 –0.05 –0.07   0.80 0.36 0.53   –1.02 –0.45 –0.66 
Republic of Korea 0.01 0.01 0.01   0.83 0.45 0.64   –2.38 –1.08 –1.56 
Malaysia –0.02 –0.01 –0.01   0.03 0.02 0.02   –0.83 –0.36 –0.53 
Mongolia 0.00 0.00 0.00   3.69 1.86 2.64   –1.77 –0.80 –1.18 
Nepal –0.08 –0.04 –0.06   1.20 0.50 0.71   –1.47 –0.66 –0.96 
Philippines 0.01 –0.02 –0.02   3.53 1.60 2.33   –1.05 –0.46 –0.69 
Thailand –0.20 –0.10 –0.15   0.28 0.00 0.00   –0.68 –0.30 –0.44 
Timor-Leste 0.12 0.05 0.07   6.45 2.80 4.19   –0.50 –0.21 –0.36 
Viet Nam –0.12 –0.07 –0.10   1.64 0.77 1.07   –5.57 –2.96 –4.01 
Source: Authors’ estimates.  
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On a per person basis, the overall rate of return from public spending on human capital relative 
to potential tax collections depends on the government strategy employed to raise human capital. In 
general, strategies that increase production efficiency without increasing inputs have little positive to no 
effect on the overall fiscal rate of return from public human capital spending (panel B). Increasing public 
spending is projected to decrease the overall fiscal rate of return (panels A and C), although the rates 
remain positive in all scenarios. 
 
 
V. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
 
In this paper, we empirically examine the effect of human capital spending on economic growth, 
income inequality, and fiscal balance in Asia. To do so, we perform a case study of the Philippines 
using subnational data and simulate the impact of human capital spending on growth, inequality, and 
fiscal balance in 12 Asian economies. Asia’s rapid population aging and its transformation into a 
middle-income region portend a bigger role for human capital in the region’s future growth. The main 
channel through which human capital affects growth and inequality is through its effect on labor 
income. Improved labor productivity boosts output and income and, to the extent that the poor 
experience a larger improvement, it also helps to reduce income inequality. Although human capital 
spending is costly for governments, its positive impact on income expands the tax base and, thus, 
government revenues. 
 
Our major source of data is the NTA database, which consists of household data that document 
economic flows across populations of different ages. The results of our empirical analysis indicate that 
human capital investment promotes both output growth and income equality in Asia, and thus 
contributes to more inclusive growth in the region. Poorer households experience a relatively larger 
increase in their labor income, which enables them to narrow the income gap with richer households. 
Further, the growth impact is larger for poorer Asian countries than for richer countries.  We also find 
that public investment is more beneficial for equity than private investment.  All in all, our evidence is 
consistent with the conventional wisdom that public spending on human capital fosters greater equality 
of opportunity. Further, our evidence suggests that the expansion of tax base and fiscal revenues more 
than offsets the cost of such spending. Overall, our evidence points to a positive effect of human capital 
on growth, equity, and fiscal balance in Asia. 
 
It should be pointed out that our benign simulated outcomes are not a guarantee of benign 
actual outcomes. The extent to which human capital investment benefits economic growth, income 
inequality, and fiscal balance will depend in part on how human capital spending is transformed to 
productive labor. Thus, other government policies and the overall economic environment also come into 
play. For example, a more flexible labor market will facilitate the transformation of human capital into 
productive employment. We also looked at three different modes of government intervention on human 
capital; namely, a universal increase in human capital spending, a targeted increase in human capital 
spending only for vulnerable groups, and an increase in the efficiency of human capital spending. Again, 
it should be noted that these strategies are not mutually exclusive, and there is plenty of scope for 
combining them with each other to create better targeted strategies. The important issue of 
effectiveness of private versus public human capital spending on productivity growth is not much in 
detail here, and is left for future studies. 
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